The guns of New Andalusia: design philosophy
A number of factors tie into the UCNA's gun culture. Amongst these are the following:The UCNA's military is diehard. The US Army could indulge the idea that its soldiers were naturally the best shots on the planet; the UCNA wasn't allowed that illusion. From Yusuf I until near the end of the six weak caliphs era [when?], the UCNA was infamous for buying soldiers wholesale. Only after phasing out both slave regiments and smoothbore muskets* did the Casba seriously start thinking about quality of fire.
- For its first half-century, the Army assumed its soldiers came in two flavors: slave-block tabula rasa who didn't even share a language with the drill sergeant, and khassa who thought chain of command was beneath them. For most of Yusuf I's career, and the first decade or so of the six weak caliphs, the emphasis was on drill, merciless drill.
- At the same time, it was assumed that the line infantry would be supplemented by people who could shoot and shoot well (historically Montagnards.) Supplemental snipers could (and would, in practice) be armed separately from the rank-and-file, often with the best their budget could pay for. (In the past, this has meant warranted gunsmiths.)
- Single-shot actions remain popular in the UCNA to the present day as a result.
- In the beginning, this was meant to make them shoot faster. By the end, the reverse was true; once the .49-94 was adopted, the Army had settled on a cartridge too long and powerful for any service repeater, and emphasis shifted to making every shot count.
- Rechambering and rebarreling guns is an inevitable part of this process, and has spawned an aftermarket culture of sorts.
- Below a certain point on the pecking order, substitute standards become the norm. Some of these substitute standards eventually become official ones. [details?]
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